IMF questions political appointments to SOE boards, cites GPHA chairman as example

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has raised concerns over the politicisation of board and executive appointments at State-Owned Enterprises (SOE).

It warns that the practice could weaken not only corporate governance but also accountability and effective oversight.

These concerns are contained in an IMF Technical Assistance Report titled “Advancing SOE Fiscal Risks Management, Financial Oversight, Governance, and Investment Implementation,” published in July 2026.

The report notes that although Ghana’s legal framework provides for merit-based appointments, the selection of boards of major state-owned enterprises remains highly centralised, with significant influence resting with the Presidency.

It says active politicians, Cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament and prominent political party officials continue to occupy board positions, including leadership roles at major state-owned entities.

Specifically, the report cites the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) as an example, noting that its inaugurated ten-member board is chaired by the national chairman of the governing party.

“In practice, boards of major SOEs are largely dominated by political appointees, with board chairs frequently being ministers, members of parliament, or prominent party officials. For example, GPHA’s newly inaugurated ten‑member board is chaired by the national chairman of the governing party, while the VRA board also includes prominent politicians alongside technocrats and a traditional leader. Compared with OECD norms, which caution against active politicians serving on SOE boards and emphasize independent, professional majorities, this represents a significant divergence”, the report said.

The IMF report observes that in Ghana, boards may influence CEO tenures informally but are not ultimately responsible for those appointments.

This, it says, can discourage boards from robustly challenging management and may incentivise CEOs to respond more to political principals than to the boards responsible for overseeing their performance.

The governance concerns come against the backdrop of persistent financial and operational challenges facing several state-owned enterprises.

While the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA) reported significant improvements in the overall financial performance of specified state entities in its 2025 State Ownership Report, including combined net profits of GH¢19.8 billion among SOEs, the IMF assessment points to governance weaknesses that could undermine the sustainability of such improvements.

“Formal and transparent procedures for the selection and appointment of SOE board members and chief executive officers remain insufficiently articulated and institutionalized. The appointment processes for some entities are not guided by clear, merit-based criteria, competency profiles, or standardized vetting procedures, increasing the risk of politicization and weakening accountability. This can undermine SOE boards effectiveness, dilute fiduciary responsibility, and adversely affect SOE performance.”